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Book Reviews 
concept, has failed to do justice to the interests of both society and person, one 
and many" (p. 213). 
Although Gunton falls prey to overschematization in subsuming the history 
of Western culture under the classical option of Parmenides versus Heraclitus, 
the one versus the many, his analysis proves an effective springboard for his trini-
tarian theology of creation presented in part 2. Situating his project methodo-
logically as a via media between Barth and Aquinas, Gunton argues for a "non-
authoritarian approach to a trinitarian theology of being, meaning the truth": a 
trinitarian fundamental ontology predicated on the basis of revelation, but whose 
categories "can be shown to correspond to the structures of universal human 
rationality" (p. 211). Developing S. T. Coleridge's insight that the Trinity is the 
"primary Idea" (p. 144), the source from which all universals spring, Gunton 
generates three transcendental categories from the divine trinitarian economy: 
perichoresis, hypostasis, and relationality. These trinitarian transcendentals, in 
turn, supply the coordinates for a relational ontology which essays to give due 
weight to both the unity and the plurality of being. 
The One, the Three and the Many is Gunton's most ambitious and complex theo-
logical project to date, synthesizing various lines of thought from his earlier works 
(on the Enlightenment, the Trinity, and the doctrine of creation) into a mature 
theology of culture. This book ably fulfills its stated intent: to undertake a genuine 
dialogue between the truths of Christianity and the culture of modernity. On the 
one hand, Gunton integrates the Enlightenment critique of Christian theology 
into his account of the flawed development of the doctrines of God and creation 
in the West. On the other, he vigorously challenges modernity's immanent deities 
and ideologies with his trinitarian conceptuality of God and of the structures of 
created reality. 
Where Gunton's project proves less successful is in delineating the practical 
consequences of his trinitarian theology of creation for the crisis of modernity. 
While the author argues convincingly that a theory of trinitarian transcendentals 
addresses the metaphysical problem of the one and the many, the anticipated 
concrete proposal for a trinitarian vision of culture remains disappointingly 
sketchy. Nonetheless, Gunton is to be commended for boldly taking up the classi-
cal challenge of defending the Trinity as the ultimate source of the truth, good-
ness, and beauty of all reality. 
joY ANN McDoUGALL, Chicago, Illinois. 
ANDERSON, PAMELA SuE. Ricoeur and Kant: Philosophy of the Will. Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1993. xvii+147 pp. $29.95 (cloth); $19.95 (paper). 
This fine book by Pamela Sue Anderson provides a close reading of Paul Ricoeur's 
philosophy of the will from the perspective of Immanuel Kant's critical philoso-
phy. Anderson argues that Ricoeur's work is an extension and refinement of 
Kant's dual-aspect notion of the subject, in which the subject is understood as 
both active and passive, voluntary and involuntary, nontemporal and temporal. 
Anderson is particularly interested in the theological significance of Ricoeur's 
project, that is, in the way religious stories and symbols have the potential to 
mediate the dual-aspect nature of human experience. 
The book's first three chapters make Anderson's case concerning Ricoeur's 
fundamental indebtedness to Kant's project. Beginning with Ricoeur's earlier po-
etics of the will in books such as Fallible Man (Chicago, 1965) and The Symbolism of 
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Evil (New York, 1967), Anderson maintains that Ricoeur is basically sympathetic 
to Kant's hermeneutic of the symbols of radical evil as an exercise that can only 
take place outside the parameters of Kant's critical philosophy. The reason for the 
exteriority of religion to philosophy in Kant's thought stems from the problem of 
the "captive free will," an aporia that is not approachable on the basis of the 
methodology in the three Critiques . Kant argues that, while an originary disposi-
tion to evil is basic to the human condition, this disposition can only be indirectly 
"thought" by interrogating the figures and myths of religious belief; it cannot be 
directly "known" as an element of objective knowledge and experience. Anderson 
demonstrates Ricoeur's nuanced dependence on Kant's fundamental anthropol-
ogy by virtue of Ricoeur's analysis of the innately faulted character of human 
volition. Humans suffer from the loss of free will through a propensity to evil, 
even though, paradoxically, the actual performance of evil is a result of free 
choice rather than "original sin." Evil, then, is our predilection but also our re-
sponsibility; we are both victimized by it and culpable for it. "Evil appears both 
as an aspect of conscious choice and as an aspect of the universally given" (p. 56). 
Kant's response to this paradox-a response Ricoeur similarly deploys-con-
sists in interpreting the archetype of Christ as a unifying symbolization of the 
divided will reconciled with itself. The value of this archetype lies in its ability to 
refigure the will and thereby liberate it from its predisposition to evil. The arche-
type is generated by a "schematism of hope" in which the rational concept of a will 
no longer bound by evil inclinations is rendered intelligible and applicable to 
experience by the concrete example of an individual who singularly embodies the 
autonomy of a rational will. Anderson notes, however, that for Ricoeur the chris-
tological archetype in Kant is a moral figure of the productive imagination, not 
an extension of knowledge into the inner nature of Reality, as one finds in Hegel's 
philosophical christology. Ricoeur, then, further agrees with Kant (pace Hegel) 
that the proper telos for philosophy of religion is to interpret the rich imagery of 
religious faith in order to enable the practical realization of human freedom. In 
the archetype of Christ as the temporal realization of an original nontemporal 
good, the problem of the dual-aspect will is symbolically mediated. 
In the conclusion, Anderson provides her own critical assessment of Ricoeur's 
philosophy of the will against the backdrop of Kant's transcendental idealism. 
She notes that, as Kant can be read in two directions-as the "transcendental 
Kant" and the "Kant of practical reason" (p. 128)-so also does Ricoeur's appro-
priation of Kant's legacy saddle Ricoeur's project with an irresolvable tension 
between an idealist notion of the productive imagination and a historical concern 
with transformative praxis. Ricoeur seeks to resolve this tension through a poetics 
of narrative discourse that operates according to a two-fold hermeneutical ges-
ture. The capacity to generate narrativized figures of hope and fulfillment is a 
transcendental feature of human experience that has the potential both to cri-
tique inauthentic forms of life (hermeneutics of suspicion) and to liberate new 
forms of praxis (hermeneutics of restoration). Ricoeur writes that one must always 
exercise caution and suspicion toward the figures and stories provided by the 
imagination because such figures and stories may be rooted in political and social 
distortions. But Anderson, by way of a sort of immanent critique of Ricoeur's 
work, argues that the French philosopher has not gone far enough in specifying 
the multiple historical conditions that can effectively subvert the supposedly au-
thentic work of the imagination. 
MARK I. WALLACE, Swarthmore College. 
The Journal of Religion 
